Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s Diverging Paths on the Abraham Accords
As China-Central Asia treaty signals expansion, Saudi talks move cautiously while Pakistan reaffirms non-recognition of Israel
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan are charting very different trajectories with regard to the Abraham Accords, the diplomatic framework that normalises relations between Israel and Arab or Muslim-majority states.
In Washington this month, U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated his hope that Saudi Arabia will formally join the Accords, signalling its inclusion could prompt others to follow.
Around the same time, Pakistan’s government reaffirmed its long-standing refusal to recognise Israel or join the Accords, citing its support for Palestinian statehood.
In a major step, Kazakhstan announced its accession to the Abraham Accords, expanding the initiative beyond the Middle East and illustrating how the project may evolve into a broader regional framework.
Meanwhile, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is scheduled to visit Washington on 18 November for talks with the U.S. administration, with the Abraham Accords and potential normalisation with Israel expected to form part of the agenda.
Reports note Saudi leaders condition such a move on progress in the Palestinian peace process.
By contrast, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar have publicly reiterated that Pakistan will not recognise Israel or join the Accords because doing so would contradict Islamabad’s support for a sovereign Palestinian state and entrenched policy.
Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, in a media interview earlier this year, acknowledged that normalisation cannot be ruled out entirely—but top officials subsequently rejected the idea, maintaining consistency with Pakistan’s historical stance.
The diverging stances reflect differing geopolitical priorities.
Saudi Arabia, a major Gulf power, is weighing economic, security and diplomatic incentives tied to normalising with Israel, often in concert with U.S. strategic interests.
Pakistan, meanwhile, remains anchored by domestic political sensitivities, strong public support for Palestine, and institutional ties grounded in longstanding Muslim solidarity.
Analysts suggest that while Saudi participation could open the door to wider Arab-Israeli normalisation, Pakistan’s abstention underscores the limits of the Accords’ expansion without a comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian conflict.
Looking ahead, the next few weeks will be telling.
The White House visit by the Saudi crown prince may yield new signals or frameworks for normalisation, while Pakistan continues to face pressure from U.S. and Gulf interlocutors to reconsider its stance.
Institutions and commentators alike view Saudi Arabia’s decision as pivotal: should Riyadh join, the Abraham Accords may evolve into a much broader regional architecture; without it, the process may remain limited to selected states.
Meanwhile Pakistan’s position confirms that for some Muslim-majority nations the Palestinian issue remains central to any diplomatic reckoning with Israel.
In Washington this month, U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated his hope that Saudi Arabia will formally join the Accords, signalling its inclusion could prompt others to follow.
Around the same time, Pakistan’s government reaffirmed its long-standing refusal to recognise Israel or join the Accords, citing its support for Palestinian statehood.
In a major step, Kazakhstan announced its accession to the Abraham Accords, expanding the initiative beyond the Middle East and illustrating how the project may evolve into a broader regional framework.
Meanwhile, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is scheduled to visit Washington on 18 November for talks with the U.S. administration, with the Abraham Accords and potential normalisation with Israel expected to form part of the agenda.
Reports note Saudi leaders condition such a move on progress in the Palestinian peace process.
By contrast, Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar have publicly reiterated that Pakistan will not recognise Israel or join the Accords because doing so would contradict Islamabad’s support for a sovereign Palestinian state and entrenched policy.
Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, in a media interview earlier this year, acknowledged that normalisation cannot be ruled out entirely—but top officials subsequently rejected the idea, maintaining consistency with Pakistan’s historical stance.
The diverging stances reflect differing geopolitical priorities.
Saudi Arabia, a major Gulf power, is weighing economic, security and diplomatic incentives tied to normalising with Israel, often in concert with U.S. strategic interests.
Pakistan, meanwhile, remains anchored by domestic political sensitivities, strong public support for Palestine, and institutional ties grounded in longstanding Muslim solidarity.
Analysts suggest that while Saudi participation could open the door to wider Arab-Israeli normalisation, Pakistan’s abstention underscores the limits of the Accords’ expansion without a comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian conflict.
Looking ahead, the next few weeks will be telling.
The White House visit by the Saudi crown prince may yield new signals or frameworks for normalisation, while Pakistan continues to face pressure from U.S. and Gulf interlocutors to reconsider its stance.
Institutions and commentators alike view Saudi Arabia’s decision as pivotal: should Riyadh join, the Abraham Accords may evolve into a much broader regional architecture; without it, the process may remain limited to selected states.
Meanwhile Pakistan’s position confirms that for some Muslim-majority nations the Palestinian issue remains central to any diplomatic reckoning with Israel.
